Non-custodial sanctions, particularly those that are implemented in the community, have different historical roots in common and civil law jurisdictions.
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with fixed penalties for every offence. When an offence has been committed, it should be prosecuted without exception; following a conviction, the fixed penalty should be imposed without variation by the courts; and the punishment, typically imprisonment, should be implemented in full. In its extreme form this model is usually associated with the idealistic legality of the revolutionary French Code of 1791, which gradually proliferated across much of Western Europe. The model sought to prevent the abuse of discretion by abolishing it at different stages in the process. Supporters argued that if punishment has been set appropriately in legislation, it would be proportionate to the crime and that it should apply equally to all who chose to break the law (Dupont, 1979) . Their equal ability to choose how to conduct themselves was simply assumed (Pieth, 2001) .
From the second half of 19 th century onwards the continental classical ideal came into conflict with positivist challenges to the notion of untrammelled choice.
For positivists, offenders could be seen primarily either as innocents, whose crimes were the result of circumstance, or as hardened habitual criminals, whose capacity to choose not to offend had all but disappeared. Evidence showed that a depressing number of offenders committed further crimes, particularly those subjected to imprisonment. What was to be done?
For those whose primary thinking was shaped by the classical ideal, the answer was to try and preserve resistance to abuse of discretion inherent in that model, while dealing with the reality that it did not always prevent crime effectively.
Leaving aside the question of the 'habitual' offenders, the answer was an alternative to imprisonment: a suspended sentence, at least for more (morally) innocent first and young offenders. Such offenders would have a proportionate term of imprisonment imposed upon them, but its coming into effect would be (wholly or partially) suspended for a period of time. If during that time the offender did not commit an offence his sentence would not come into effect. This approach had the advantage of preserving the notion that the offender had a choice to offend. He was simply given a further choice with the threat of additional punishment underlying the decision.
Further conclusions flowed from this approach. Since the offender was capable of rational choice, there was no need to offer him any assistance or impose any restrictions during the period of suspension, other than the actual sentence if he was convicted of a further offence. Indeed, the distrust of discretion worked in the opposite direction. It was considered undesirable for the courts to have the power to judge individuals and to order tailored intervention in their lives -other than the loss of liberty which formally applied equally to all who were subject to it.
For the same reason there should be no discretion in bringing suspended sentences into effect against those who had reoffended during the suspension period.
The initial appearances of suspended sentences of imprisonment in legislation closely followed the restrictiveness of the classical model. Belgian and French legislation, of 1888 and 1891 respectively, provide primary examples of laws that permitted suspension of short sentences of imprisonment on the sole condition that the convicted offender not reoffend during the suspension (Ancel, 6 1971: 13-14) . Much the same effect was achieved after 1895 in the territories that would become modern Germany, by routinely pardoning offenders on condition that they avoid reoffending (Meyer-Reil, 2005) .
From the late 19 th century onwards, provision also began to be made in these countries for early release from prison. In its 19 th century incarnation in France and Belgium, early release was often a form of 'parole' in which released offenders, unlike those whose sentences were suspended from the point of conviction, were subject to supervision in the community by civilian 'comités de patronage' (Christiaensen, 2004) . Early release in these systems had a close connection to the ancient power of the sovereign to pardon, but was deployed more systematically to a growing range of offenders (Whitman, 2003) .
Probation
While the suspended sentence was emerging as an alternative to imprisonment within the broadly classical tradition, a very different model was developing in common law jurisdictions. This model was 'probation', regarded, initially at least, simply as a way of avoiding the formal imposition of punishment entirely and replacing it with some form of community-based supervision. Probation emerged almost simultaneously in England and in the US (Timasheff 1943a: 1-2) . This reflected the pragmatism of the common law, with developments in the US serving as a source of continual inspiration for those in England.
Probation in Europe undoubtedly began in the United Kingdom (Vanstone, 2008) .
Although formally enshrined as a state institution only in 1907, the English probation movement traces its origins back further. In his centenary review of its development, Timasheff (1943a: 12-13) identified the origins of British probation in the work of a Birmingham judge in 1841, who was prepared to place 'juvenile delinquents' under the supervision of parents, masters, or volunteers. Nellis (2007: 28) also pointed to a tradition in English penal practice as early as the 18 th century of exercising 'preventative justice', which aimed to avoid the imposition of punishment in favour of judicial oversight.
The institutionalisation of English probation was primarily a product of Victorian civil society, rather than a principled development of the criminal justice system. 19 th century English public discourse was characterised by both explicit moralism and considerable emphasis on charity as a response to social problems (Mair and Burke, 2012: 7-24) . Both strands contributed to the formation of rudimentary analogues of modern probation institutions. Crime was viewed principally as a product of social and moral decay, which led, it was feared, to the creation of a 'criminal class' united against the prosperous middle-class mainstream (Emsley, 2010: 177-187) . This inspired the intervention of numerous charitable organisations into the lives of offenders, which aimed to secure the spiritual and social 'salvation' of offenders by engaging with alcohol addiction. These organisations played a similar role to the civilian 'comités de patronage' in Francophone Europe, with the important difference that, unlike their continental 8 counterparts, they focused on offenders prior to (or instead of) formal sentence, rather than on released prisoners.
Gradually these activities were incorporated into statute and the charitable interveners replaced with a formal secular institution, the probation service, created in 1907 (Nellis, 2007: 28-31) . The activities comprising English 'probation' are diverse, having been accumulated piecemeal over the service's existence (see McGarva, 2008: 269-278 for a comprehensive overview of modern functions). From the outset, the probation service was responsible for non-custodial supervision of offenders, especially juveniles. During the interwar years, the probation service expanded its role in adult justice and the probation officers' trade union, the National Association of Probation Officers, campaigned with some success for probation supervision to be seen as a specialised 'part of a wider social work "profession"' (Nellis, 2007: 34) . Critically, until the 1990s, this supervision was largely regarded as an alternative to punishment, the imposition of which was postponed conditionally: on the offender not reoffending or infringing other requirements of probation (Mair, 1998: 263) . The focus was on the social work aspects of probation, summed up by the service's famous injunction to 'advise, assist, and befriend' offenders (Canton, 2011: 30) . Their responsibilities in this area continued to expand as a range of 'community sentences' other than supervision developed during the second half of the 20th century.
The English probation service also developed a key role in the 'aftercare' of ex-prisoners from the 1920s onwards, initially alongside wider civil society, but formally taking over in 1965. This, in turn, morphed into a formal responsibility for the supervision of offenders released early from prison on parole (Maguire, 2007: 399-401) .
Consensual synthesis or a synthetic consensus?
The suspended sentences of continental Europe and the probation systems of the common law did not exist in separate silos. Even before the English probation system was enshrined in legislation, probation had been the subject of debate in the civilian-dominated 'scientific' conferences of the 19 th and early 20th centuries, which adopted resolutions that were the early forerunners of the European standards of the 1990s. Gradual changes in national practice followed from this. In particular the continental European systems began to attach conditions to some of their grants of suspension of sentences: this happened not only in the Franco-Belgian-German core but also in most other northern, western and southern European countries (Timasheff, 1943b: 1-62; van Kalmthout and Durnescu, 2008: 3-5, 10-12) .
As in England, volunteer bodies that had assisted prisoners in the Netherlands and other countries began to be transformed into 'professional' probation organisations. Typically, they too were employed directly or indirectly by the state and approached their task with a strong 'social work' focus, but operated inevitably in the penal shadow of the criminal justice system. From the beginning these organisations had much in common when it came to dealing with released prisoners. Gradually their affinity increased in the area of implementing community sentences too, as suspension of imprisonment in continental Europe increasingly became conditional on submission to community sanctions and measures. By 1981, their interests were sufficiently common across Europe to allow the establishment of the 'Conférence Permanente Européenne de la Probation' (CEP) (Scott, 2006 The admission, timid at first, of probation into the criminal law of the Continent may thus contain the germ of later reforms which will tend to transform the old Continental criminal procedure into a modern procedure of défense sociale. (Ancel, 1952: 38) Ancel observed, however, that the concerns of the lawyers for procedural probity should and could be met, by linking probation to the existing institution of the suspended sentence.
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The United Nations continued to play a significant role in the development of alternative sanctions in Europe, particularly through the work of its formal affiliate, the Helsinki Institute for Crime Prevention and Control (HEUNI). A major HEUNI conference in 1987 brought together participants from Western and Eastern Europe to discuss a study of non-custodial alternatives in Europe, which HEUNI had commissioned (HEUNI, 1988; Bishop, 1988 A feature of this study was the depth of its analysis. It began by situating criminal justice in the context of wider social policy and emphasised that other systems of social control had a key part to play, not only in assisting the criminal justice system but in avoiding invoking it at all. It recognised the stigmatising effect of every institutional form of social control including criminal justice interventions and therefore argued that all penal interventions, custodial or otherwise, ought to be used as minimally, and to intervene in offenders' lives as little as possible. While it noted that 'for many offenders supervision on probation was likely to be at least as effective in preventing recidivism as a custodial sentence', it unanimously supported the more extensive use of fines, which it found had even lower recidivism rates than imprisonment or probation (European Committee on Crime Problems, 1976:28).
In 1986 Rentzman and Robert built on this study as the basis for a further report, Alternative Measures to Imprisonment, which they presented to the annual Conference of Directors of Prison Administrations, held by the Council of Europe. In this report, the differences between a suspended sentence and probation order are effectively buried: they were simply described as 'different legal forms of probation' (Rentzman and Robert, 1986: 9) . Comprehensive standards adopted (1988) (1989) (1990) (1991) (1992) servants who, both as individuals and through the IPPF, sought to shape other standards being developed around the same time. Indeed, the preamble to the Groningen Rules noted that both the United Nations and the Council of Europe were already working in this area and invited them to make use of these new Rules.
The Groningen Rules focussed narrowly on interventionist non-custodial measures. The Commentary to the Rules specifies that (1) they were not intended to be 'instruments to promote the increased use of non-custodial sanctions and measures in general' (IPPF, 1988: 18) and (2) they did not deal with general crime and sentencing policy. They focused primarily on the authorities responsible for enforcement and emphasised the human, civil and political rights of those subject to liberty restrictions in the community (Rule 4).
In contrast to the Groningen Rules, the Tokyo Rules dealt predominantly with sentencing policy and safeguards against abuses. They were intended ensure that Member States develop non-custodial measures 'to provide other options, thus reducing the use of imprisonment, and to rationalize criminal justice policies…' (Rule 1.5). According to the official Commentary, the purpose of the Tokyo Rules was an overall reduction of imprisonment, i.e. both the number of custodial measures imposed and the actual length of any such deprivation (United Nations, 1993: 7). The Rules were to 'be part of the movement towards depenalization and decriminalization' (see Rules 2.6 and 2.7). The official Commentary warns presciently:
Respect for individual rights and freedoms as set out in international instruments requires that penal measures should not be imposed where they cannot be justified using strict criteria. Since non-custodial measures are less intrusive than custody there is a danger that they may be imposed even when the development of society would no longer require it. (United Nations, 1993: 10)
Though both the Tokyo and Groningen Rules sought to balance their wider penal policy pronouncements with human rights concerns, the Tokyo Rules had one distinct limitation: Rule 1.3 provided that:
The [Tokyo] Rules shall be implemented taking into account the political, economic, social and cultural conditions of each country and the aims and objectives of its criminal justice system.
This qualification rather undermined the thrust of the Tokyo Rules, virtually inviting countries to justify their existing practices on the basis of prevailing conditions instead of re-examining them in the light of human rights principles (Morgenstern, 2002: 86) . Could European instruments give tighter protection to human rights, while retaining the reductionist focus of the Tokyo Rules?
The answer is yes. The European Rules on Community Sanctions and Measures more effectively balanced the reductionist focus of the Tokyo Rules with tighter protection of human rights. Additional guarantees included respect for privacy and dignity of offenders (see rules 20 to 29). The principle of legality was also highlighted: community sanctions and measures must be defined in law and cannot be of indefinite duration; procedures for imposing and enforcing them must be specified in law too (Rules 3 -11). In addition, the Recommendation on Consistency in Sentencing, adopted by the Council of Europe in the same year, saw community sanctions as part of a wider range of non-custodial sentences, and met the reductionist requirements of the Tokyo Rules by requiring that imprisonment become a measure of last resort imposed for the minimum period possible (Ashworth, 1994 
Existing ideas underplayed in the lead up to 1992

Liberal scepticism
The eventual acceptance of comprehensive European standards for community sanctions and measures meant that some existing ideas had to be abandoned. One, voiced during the run-up to the Groningen Rules, was a liberal scepticism towards international rule-making in this area. In a remarkable paper presented to an IPPF colloquium in Poitiers in 1987, William Bohan, a senior civil servant in the English Home Office, argued that although interventions aiming to reduce prison populations were desirable, international rules were badly suited to regulating them (Bohan, 1989) . In his view, successful intervention emphasised the non-criminal justice aspects of community treatment. His approach reflected a revival of neoclassical ideals, under which offenders were expected to take responsibility for their conduct. Meeting their social needs should not be the function of penal institutions, lest these institutions become disproportionately repressive.
The model of traditional English probation was prominent in Bohan's presentation. He referred approvingly to 'the professional casework relationship in which the probation officer's warm and sincere concern fertilises the probationer's capacity for growth and change' but asked rhetorically: 'are there to be standard minimum rules for the practice of friendship? ' Bohan (1989: 46) . Although he did not argue that there should be a separation between the social work and purely penal aspects of community sanctions -that is, that steps should be taken to ensure that offenders could be sentenced to social work -Bohan played down the abuses that could arise in both social work interventions and in the more restrictive aspects of community sanctions. He concluded that in any event, given divergent practices in this area, the development of international standards for community sanctions was premature.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Bohan's conclusions were not supported by any other IPPF member. Many of them, like the chairman, Hans Tulkens (1989) , simply stressed that international standards were needed to protect persons subject to community sanctions against abuse.
One of the most interesting responses to Bohan came from Edgardo Rotman, who was already establishing his reputation as a leading theorist of rehabilitation.
According to Rotman (1986) , rehabilitation should be seen not as a philosophy favouring paternalistic and oppressive forms of intervention in offenders' lives but rather as offenders' right to enjoy opportunities to improve themselves. He conceded that Bohan correctly questioned whether there are minimum standards for friendship but argued that the function of minimum standards was to create 'certain objective conditions that make interpersonal action possible and meaningful' (Rotman, 1989: 170) . He explained that such rules 'not only help to avoid abuses in state intervention but also establish positive duties of the state to provide certain services and opportunities with a minimum degree of quality and frequency' (Rotman, 1989: 170) . As explained below, this notion of a positive duty on states to provide opportunities for offenders was adopted by supporters of an expanded role for community sanctions in the future.
Bohan's remarks were made in the context of a debate about a specific proposal to introduce rules to govern community sanctions and measures and one can understand why they were resisted. What was missing in the wider debates of the late 1980s was any explicit discussion of the 'traditional' suspended sentence, that is, one placing no additional burden on the offender other than the injunction not to reoffend.
There was some support for these 'pure' suspended sentences on the grounds that they did not intervene unnecessarily in the lives of those subjected to it. However, proponents of intervention were on the rise. Looking back on this period, the Cambridge criminologist, Sir Leon Radzinowicz expressed his contempt both for the pure suspended sentence and for sentences suspended on more elaborate conditions:
I turned against [the suspended sentence] in the most categorical terms. I tried to show that [it] was largely used on the continent faute de mieux, simply because they did not have probation or conditional discharge; that in comparison the suspended sentence was definitely inferior; and if added to probation and conditional discharge it would harm their basic distinctiveness and in practice confuse both the offenders concerned and the courts. (Radzinowicz, 1999: 329) .
Radical non-interventionism
Support for the traditional suspended sentence may have been expected, especially for those who favoured various forms of penal non-interventionism. In Europe a movement favouring radical non-interventionism (cf. Schur 1973) had been taking shape in academic penology since the late 1960s, and was much bolstered by the widely published finding that in the sphere of rehabilitation, 'nothing works' (Martinson, 1974) .
In Europe, radical non-interventionism took the form of an abolitionist critique of the prison as the site of penal processes (van Swaaningen, 1997: 116-130 ). Some Europeans from this tradition were prepared to work with the Council of Europe in order to propose reforms that would reduce the scope of criminal law in society generally (Cf. Hulsman, 1980 Hulsman, , 1984 . However, they do not appear to have engaged directly in the 1992 standard-setting on non-custodial sanctions.
Perhaps it was the extent to which the standards of this period collectively held out the promise of a reduction in prison population that led European Why did it not continue to say 'in order to replace sentences of imprisonment' or words with similar effect? In the 1990s it may have been reasonable to assume that this was implicit in the context of the Recommendation as a whole. In the following decade, however, this assumption could not readily be made, as the next section demonstrates.
Ambiguities in 21 st century standards
Close analysis of 21 st century Council of Europe recommendations related to noncustodial sanctions reveals a change of emphasis. The inherent value of these dispositions began to be highlighted and less attention was paid to prison population reduction or offenders' (human) rights. 
Effectiveness of community sanctions
Effectiveness through intervention
The same commitment to community based programmes was reflected in the 2003
Recommendation concerning Conditional Release (Parole). As has become apparent, the mechanism of imposing a sentence, then suspending it conditionally, in whole or in part, and thus releasing the offender was one of the most important bases of interventionist to count as 'conditional' for its purposes. What makes this more serious is that in some European countries, such as Germany (Dünkel and Pruin, 2010) and Belgium (Snacken et al, 2010) , the period during which a former prisoner will be subject to post-release conditions may routinely be significantly longer than the original prison sentence. 6 The practical outcome is that where additional conditions are imposed, prisoners refuse release because it means that they will be under state control for longer (whilst subject to a high risk of recall) than if they remain in prison.
The Recommendation on Conditional Release, as its preamble makes clear, was designed to reduce the prison population. Nevertheless, by its narrow definition of 'conditional', the Recommendation may inadvertently 7 encourage the setting of conditions, thus ignoring the injunction of the Tokyo Rules that restrictive penal measures should not be unjustifiably imposed. This can be explained by the growing confidence expressed in the Preamble to the Recommendation on Conditional Release that conditional release, in the interventionist way it is defined, is 'one of the most effective and constructive means of preventing reoffending and promoting resettlement'.
Transnational enforcement
The next European instrument to address community sanctions was the 2008
Framework Decision of the European Commission 'on the application of the principle of mutual recognition to judgments and probation decisions with a view to the supervision of probation measures and alternative sanctions' (FD 947). It was designed to set up a more effective system for enforcing community sanctions imposed in one EU state on a national of another EU state. Again, the primary motive seems to have been to increase the use of community sanctions. Arguably though, this was not being done for its own sake but to reduce the use of imprisonment of foreign nationals, by enabling them to serve a community sentence in their own country (Morgenstern 2009 ). This positive view of FD 947 is reinforced by interpreting it as requiring emphasis of the social rehabilitative function of community sentences in its implementation (Snacken and McNeill, 2012) . and it seems likely that the United Kingdom will do so with FD 947.
The adoption of the FD 947 is significant in that it reflects a growing commitment of the EU to involve itself in penal matters, including non-custodial sentencing (Baker, 2013) . Although the focus of the EU is still on implementing sentences on an inter-state basis, it now also has an interest in developing substantive standards for community sanctions, which will make it easier in the future for states to accept -and therefore implement where required -other European states' sentences. However, with this interventionism comes the danger of community sanctions being used alongside, rather than in place of, other penalties.
Legitimacy and effectiveness of probation services
The most recent pronouncement on non-custodial sanctions is found in the 2010
Council of Europe Probation Rules. It follows other 21 st century instruments in that its primary purpose is to propagate community sanctions and measures and, in this case, also to entrench the position of probation agencies. To some extent this may movement, has been subject to sustained academic critique of both the narrowness of its specific methods (Ward et al, 2012) and its indifference to the wider social impact of its primary focus on dehumanising 'risk factors' (Mair, 2004) . 31
Conclusion: The way forward
Increasingly, pan-European organisations, not only the Council of Europe but now also the European Union, have involved themselves actively in the introduction and implementation of community sanctions and measures (Canton, 2009a (Canton, , 2009b cf. Baker, 2013) . Under these circumstances, the time is ripe to critically re-evaluate arguments from the perspectives of liberal scepticism and radical noninterventionism that were made in the past, as well as those from a human rights perspective, in order to ensure that probation, as it has now evolved, does not become an unnecessarily restrictive response.
Liberal scepticism
The liberal sceptical argument advanced by Bohan (1989) did not reject ameliorative intervention in social problems of the kind offered by traditional social work designed simply to help those in need. It challenged whether this could be done through a regulated system of community sanctions.
That challenge remains. There is a risk that the positive claims made for community sanctions and measures lead to disproportionate interventions.
Moreover, taking into account the social vulnerability of many offenders and victims, we should question whether the social work assistance that they require could possibly be better provided outside the penal system.
In particular, the move away from the simple suspended sentence should be re-examined. One needs to ask whether offenders would not be better handled if they were routinely given sentences suspended on the sole condition that they not reoffend for a set period. It would then be left to other, external social support systems to assist them during the period of suspension and make it less likely that they will relapse into crime. Such a development would provide a solution where offenders refuse early release from prison because they find the accompanying conditions of 'probation' too onerous, and object to their being enforced for longer than the duration of the prison term.
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Radical non-interventionism
In its European guise radical non-interventionism focused largely on prison abolitionism. A revival of its ideas would pay much more attention to less interventionist non-custodial punishments such as fines, which in some jurisdictions, such as England and Wales, have been replaced to a significant extent by community sanctions and measures (Cavadino et al, 2013: 120) . Such a revival would note that this trend is not universal. In jurisdictions such as Belgium (Snacken, 2007) and Germany (Sevdiren, 2011: 183) , fines still play a large part in the overall framework of penal sanctions without any apparent loss of efficacy of the system as a whole. A revived radical non-interventionism could emphasise the contrast between relatively non-interventionist punishments and community sanctions and measures, which restrict liberty to an extent that in some cases can parallel or even exceed the pains of imprisonment. For community sanctions and measures this has been acknowledged by some European scholars (see Boone, 2005 ) but has not really fed into the European debate about the desirability of the expanded use of community sanctions as opposed to other non-custodial sanctions.
The early critique of rehabilitationism by radical non-interventionists is widely rejected because it allegedly addressed only the straw-man of deterministic forms of compulsory rehabilitation. Defenders of community sanctions argue that a more sophisticated understanding of rehabilitation has now emerged (McNeill, 2009; Canton, 2007 Canton, , 2011 McKnight, 2009) . Such an understanding was developed by Rotman (1986 Rotman ( , 1989 who argued that the right of the offender to opportunities to rehabilitate himself held the key to constructing forms of community sanctions that recognise offender agency and are both 'positive' and human rights compliant.
This argument is not without merit. Certainly for offenders in whose lives the state intervenes by way of punishment, a case can be made for recognizing their right to opportunities to improve themselves. However, such a case is subject to two qualifications. First, there must be recognition that even the rehabilitative measures advocated by supporters of the expanded use of community penalties do involve elements of compulsion. 12 To this extent the original radical noninterventionist critique is still directly relevant.
Secondly, it must be recognised that for offenders to be able to exercise a right to rehabilitation in the positive sense that term is used by Rotman (1986) -or a right to reintegration, as it is sometimes termed (cf. Dwyer, 2013: 10) -appropriate material and social conditions must be in place. As Carlen (2013) has forcefully observed, the right to rehabilitation based on rational choices being made by the offender may be illusory, for it often presumes socially competent offenders who were at one stage part of a stable, non-deviant community to which they can return. For many offenders in unequal, class-bound societies, such a community no longer exists -if it ever did (Lacey and Zedner, 1995) . Under such circumstances, which may be far more prevalent than governments or even scholarly proponents of intervention are prepared to recognise, the judicious exercise of the prerogative of mercy leading to unconditional release may still be more effective in giving offenders opportunities to lead crime free lives.
Human rights
Human rights idealism was a key element in the creation of the instruments discussed in this paper. Whatever weaknesses they may have, these instruments all seek to reinforce the position of offenders who serve their sentences in the community. This was true not only in 1992 but also thereafter. Also, the most recent of these instruments, FD 947 and the Council of Europe Probation Rules, express their commitment to human rights values and seek to entrench them.
However, at the same time, these instruments encourage interventions in offenders' lives that may limit their freedom more than is strictly necessary.
How are these negative consequences to be avoided? One way may be by reemphasising one of the longest recognised human rights, namely the right to liberty (Hudson, 2001; Snacken, 2006) . Our overview has shown that the 1992 instruments sought to balance the needs for intervention by constantly questioning whether liberty-limiting interventions, custodial or otherwise, were required at all.
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A second way of avoiding negative consequences is to reflect on the range of human rights that need to be considered when developing instruments to shape non-custodial interventions, for the pains of probation may encompass a broader range of human rights than liberty alone (Durnescu, 2011) . In this regard human rights lawyers may seek, for example, to deploy the European Rules on Community
Sanctions and Measures to support arguments that community sanctions that stigmatise offenders by making them wear clothing that publicly identify them as person undergoing punishment, are degrading and therefore contrary to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
14 However, old nostrums may not be sufficient. It may be that a broader appreciation of human rights is necessary for the full consideration of the appropriate use of community sanctions and measures in Europe. In particular, overall socio-economic development, underpinned by a recognition of the minimum social and economic and cultural rights that all members of society are entitled to enjoy, is a more effective way of reducing crime than focusing intensively on the individuals, who are convicted of the relatively routine offences that are the target of community sanctions and measures. Consistently asking broader questions of this kind could allow European penologists to engage with broader social developments and to remain critical towards the wider (human rights) implications of any form of penal intervention (Loader and Sparks, 2013) . 11 See also American studies of 'punishment equivalencies', which have used quantitative surveys of offender opinion to demonstrate that those with experience both of imprisonment and its alternatives often prefer incarceration (Crouch, 1993; Wood and Grasmick, 1999) .
12 This is so even in jurisdictions where the offender's consent is a prerequisite of the imposition of community sanctions or measures (cf. van Zyl Smit, 1993: 324-326 ). Central to any penal intervention is the issue of compliance, that is, of ensuring that the requirements of the sanction or measure are adhered to (Canton, 2011: 123-126) . Whilst compliance must be secured on several levels (Bottoms, 2001) , it is ultimately mandated by law. Failure to engage with requirements imposed in the name of rehabilitation can lead to onerous consequences, potentially including incarceration. Under such circumstances the right to receive rehabilitative assistance easily becomes a duty to rehabilitate oneself. The more intensive the order, the more onerous that compulsion becomes. By contrast, unconditionally suspended sentences impose only the same compulsion that criminal justice places upon all citizens: not to offend. 
